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BOOK REVIEWS
intrinsic worth than comment, influential as it may have been, upon a case.
Undeniably, section 301(d) (4) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1964 indicates
that at least temporarily the horse that Professor Falk has ridden has proved a
bit unruly. Furthermore, in the longer run it could well turn out that a rule of
judicial abstention, unaffected by executive desires, is not as desirable as judicial
assertion, with or without the possibility of invocation of the act of state doctrine upon executive suggestion-a reversal of the practice of applying the
doctrine unless the executive suggested otherwise as in Bernstein v. N.V. Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche Stoomvaart-Maatschappi.6 However debatable the
merits of judicial abstention as contrasted with judicial assertion, it is essential
that probes toward depoliticizing national treatment of international law be
made. Depoliticized law, or even relatively depoliticized law, may seem impossible, particularly since so much of law is produced through political processes
and is a communication from political authorities. Yet the struggle for the law
attained to date is in part the story of efforts to embed in the life of a community ethical standards surviving the whimsy of politics. That this story is
not dichotomous only emphasizes for both scholar and practitioner the contrast
between analysis and the labor of making, applying, and enforcing law.
L. GOULD
Professor of Political Science
Purdue University
WEsLEY

THE

A=MRCAN LAW OF TREASON. By Bradley Chapin. Seattle: Univ. of
Washington Press. 1964. Pp. viii, 172. $6.00.

Professor Chapin, in this tightly constructed monograph, traces the
development of our law of treason from its medieval roots to early nineteenth
century American practices. Looking backward from the treason clause of the
United States Constitution, it is apparent that the fourteenth century statute,
25 Edward III, is dearly antecedent to the provision that "Treason against the
United States shall consist only in levying war against them, or in adhering to
their enemies, giving them aid and comfort." Similarly, 7 & 8 William I, a
product of the English revolutionary settlement, set the standard for the
minimum procedural safeguard that "no person shall be convicted of treason
unless on the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act, or on confession
in open court." How eighteenth century republican statesmen, drawing upon
their common heritage as Englishmen, established a law of treason for the
recently freed North American colonies is the central theme of this study.
Although it is somewhat beyond the scope of Professor Chapin's interest,
it is not inappropriate to point out that by the time of Magna Carta treason
6. 173 F.2d 71 (2d Cir. 1949), mandate amended, 210 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1954) (per
curiam).
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was distinguished from felony in one important respect: the lands of a person
convicted of treason were forfeit to the crown; a felon's lands escheated to his
lord. The lord whose, tenant was convicted of treason suffered along with the
guilty party, albeit a less discomforting penalty; for the vassal's misdeed the
lord was deprived of his seignorial dues. This gave the magnates strong reason
to attempt to limit the number of acts punishable as treason. It helps to explain
why the statute of Edward III was popular with the powerful landed families.
Early attempts to restrict the law of treason did not necessarily reflect the more
modern concern with individual liberties.
The legislation of Edward III limited punishment for treason to seven
proscribed acts. Subsequent Parliaments extended the scope of this law under
the impetus of national emergencies and strong willed monarchs. In addition,
Tudor and Stuart rulers achieved a successful expansion of the law of treason
through the courts and used these judicially constructed treasons to crush
political opposition. Following the revolution of 1688 the law of treason continued to be used as a bulwark against foreign threats and as a convenient
weapon against rival political factions. The revolutionary settlement, however,
did bring forth important procedural protections for those accused of treason.
In addition to the requirement that the testimony of two witnesses was necessary
for conviction, the accused was entitled to a copy of the indictment before
trial and he was privileged to be represented by counsel and to compel attendance
of witnesses for his defense. Hence forward, whatever Parliament and the
courts might do to expand the substantive law of treason, these procedural
safeguards offered some measure of protection to the accused.
Legislation in the American colonies converged, after some early experimentation, on the familiar pattern of the English law of treason. As in the mother
country, in time of threat or emergency the number of substantive offenses
identified as treason was enlarged markedly. In time of calm and quiet, the list
contracted. But through both turmoil and peace the procedural traditions remained steadfast.
When England and the colonies came into open conflict after 1763, the
British made several unsuccessful attempts to control dissidents among the
colonials by invoking the treason law. Prosecutors were unable to secure the
necessary witnesses to convict Americans of treason when the trials were held
in the colonies, and the effort to transfer these trials to the mother country
was met with bitter colonial hostility; local control of judicial proceedings was
a fundamental right of Englishmen and not to be surrendered peaceably.
The novelty of Professor Chapin's study lies in his extensive use of local
court records covering the period from the beginnings of revolt in the colonies to
the adoption of the Constitution. These were tumultuous times; old loyalties
were torn asunder and new ones were slow to develop. The states were charged
with the dual task of fighting a major war with a powerful foreign enemy and at
the same time solidifying the domestic population behind a new government.
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Divided loyalties were commonplace, and many citizens appeared indifferent to
the outcome of the fighting. The law of treason was expanded to include many
new acts and prosecutions were numerous, but throughout the entire period
Professor Chapin's research unfolds an amazing fidelity to fair procedural
standards.
Legislatures frequently authorized special proceedings by civilian and
military authorities to try accused traitors. But Professor Chapin concludes
that the sheer number of these statutes gives a misleading impression. While
many persons accused of treason were brought under the jurisdiction of
military tribunals and special commissioners, the great majority of cases, were
handled in the regular courts. Where local conditions had so disrupted the
judicial machinery that court trials were not available, the findings of military
tribunals and commissioners were reviewed regularly by legislative 'authorities.
The record discloses that sentences meted out by nonjudicial bodies frequently
were reduced or set aside and pardons were also common.
This is not to say that the new government failed to invoke the treason
laws with vigor. The records of judicial bodies reflect a stern commitment to the
revolutionary cause; yet in conclusion Professor Chapin is deeply impressed
with the respect shown for the procedural rights of defendants, and under the
circumstances, the law acted with restraint. As Professor Chapin summarizes
his findings:
• . . the procedure here described exhibits a law of diminishing
returns. The policy in regard to traitors became more cautious as
the process approached execution. Wholesale arrests and commitments
were common. The pace slowed perceptibly at the stage of grand jury
indictments. Judges and juries showed great reserve in dealing with
the lives of accused traitors. Even after conviction, pardons prevented
most executions. Only a tiny minority of those charged with treason
ever experienced the terror of the gallows and the hangman's noose.
Drastic purges and violent assizes were not a part of the Revolution.
There was no reign of terror. The record is one of substantial justice
done.
In attempting to account for the procedural restraint which accompanied
American treason trials and for the relatively small number of executions which
followed conviction, Professor Chapin suggests that one important explanation
lies in the ready availability of alternative methods of effectuating government
policy. Most states made frequent recourse to confiscation statutes in dealing
with disloyal subjects. Outlawry and attainder were used to strip Tories of
their property. Through direct legislative action or simplified judicial proceedings the government was able to secure funds to fight the war and was not forced
to take recourse in the treason laws. The fact that many disloyal persons fled
the country frequently eliminated any need for choice.
Whatever temptation we may have to suggest that confiscation of one's
property by legislative fiat is hardly distinguishable from a reign of terror should
345
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be tempered by viewing these alternatives from the guilty man's perspective:
at least the victim of a confiscatory statute lived to complain of the injustice.
The prospective implications of the government's restrained treason policy
were also important. The decision of the Constitutional Convention that treason
prosecutions were not to be a legitimate means of silencing political opposition,
as expressed in the very restrictive language of Article III, section 3, should
not be overlooked. That the country was able to survive the revolutionary crisis
without recourse to the frightening potentialities of widespread treason trials
must have been apparent to the founding fathers.
Professor Chapin has done a distinct service in depicting the fidelity to
standards of procedural fairness which characterized treason trials during the
early years of the American republic. This study describes an important episode
in the evolution of our modem concepts of due process of law. The awesome
power of the state and the possibility of its misuse by agents of the peoplebe they sincere or self-serving-has been an ever present consideration in the
attempt to define fair criminal procedure. The author's imaginative use of
local court records to supplement the legislative record is a heartening
demonstration that the professional historian has an important role in reconstructing the history of American law.
PETER SIMMONS

Associate Professor, School of Law,
State University of New York at Buffalo

